The Impact of the Euro on the United States Equity Markets by Jacob, Joseph F.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 13 
Issue 2 Volume 13, Winter 1998, Issue 2 Article 9 
December 1998 
The Impact of the Euro on the United States Equity Markets 
Joseph F. Jacob 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Jacob, Joseph F. (1998) "The Impact of the Euro on the United States Equity Markets," Journal of Civil 
Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 13 : Iss. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol13/iss2/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE IMPACT OF THE EURO ON THE
UNITED STATES EQUITY MARKETS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Treaty on European Union,1 signed at Maastricht on Feb-
ruary 7, 1992, provided the blueprint for attaining full Economic
and Monetary Union ("EMU") in the European Union ("EU"). 2
The European Council of Finance Ministers adopted a three-
stage process for the transition to monetary union. 3 Stage one
marked the start of an economic and monetary policies coordi-
nation among the Member States.4 During stage two, the EU
institutions monitored and reviewed the Member States' eco-
nomic and monetary policies. 5 At the start of stage three 6 on
1 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
719, available in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter MAASTRICHT TREATY]. See The Euro:
435 Days to Go, Opening Address by Mr. Jacques Santer, President of the European
Commission, THE 5TH CEMS GRADUATE CONFERENCE 5 (1997) [hereinafter THE
GRADUATE CONFERENCE]. The Treaty on European Union is designed to establish the
euro as one of the most stable currencies in the world as well as to establish the Euro-
pean center for economic and monetary decision making. Id.
2 See generally TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J.
(C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. There are 15 sig-
natories to the treaty: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and United Kingdom. Id.; see also Green Paper on the Practical Arrangements for the
Introduction of the Single Currency, COM (95)333 final at 6 [hereinafter Practical Ar-
rangements]. Denmark and United Kingdom reserved the right not to participate in
monetary union.
3 See Werner Van Lembergen & Margaret G. Wachenfeld, Economic and Monetary
Union in Europe: Legal Implications of the Arrival of the Single Currency, 22 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1, 72-73 (1998) (stating EMU timetable); see also Practical Arrangements, su-
pra note 2, at 18 (stating that transition into euro is three-phase scenario: Phase A,
launch of economic and monetary union (EMU); Phase B, effective start of EMU; Phase
C, changeover to single currency).
4 See Council Directive 88/361, art. 67, 1988 O.J. (L 178/5) (discussing implementa-
tion of Article 67 of Treaty Establishing the European Community).
5 See EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 109e(4), at 40, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 648; Protocol
on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 1992 O.J. (C 224/1) 120-21, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
769-70 (requiring that Member States' government deficits not exceed 3% of GDP and
government debt not exceed 60% of GDP).
6 See Practical Arrangements, supra note 2, at 22-23 (stating that stage three might
take several weeks encompassing physical replacement of national notes and coins by
euro as well as complete changeover of banks and financial system along with exclusive
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January 1, 1999, the euro became the monetary unit of those
member states of the EU that fulfilled certain convergence re-
quirements and elected to participate. 7
An economically united Europe has become a reality with the
successful launching of the euro on January 4, 1999.8 The shift
to a single currency in Europe is predicted to increase efficiency
in the European markets, 9 enhance monetary stability, 10 and
eliminate transactional costs related to the existence of many
fragmented European currencies. 11 Another aim of the single
currency is to strengthen the European financial markets by
dealings of all private non-bank sector's transactions in euro).
7 See James H. Freis, Jr., Continuity of Contracts After the Introduction of the Euro:
The United States Response to European Economic and Monetary Union, 53 BuS. LAW.
701, 702 (1998). The 11 Member States will participate in stage three; Denmark, Swe-
den, Greece and United Kingdom are not participating. Id.; Bruce Barnard, Count Down
to the Euro, EUR. MAG., Sept. 1997, at 8. The Euro Timetable is as follows: In 1997, coun-
tries will be qualified for the EMU based on their economic performance. Id. In 1998, the
European Commission and the European Monetary Institute will give their evaluation
on individual performance to the EU's finance ministers. Id. And in May 1998, a special
EU summit will be held where leaders of the 15 member states will cast their vote on the
successful candidates. Id. The summit will appoint the executive board of European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB). Id. The board will set up the ECB and the linked European System of
Central Banks, which will prepare the printing of euro notes and coins in mid-1998, a
process that will take three years. Id. In 1998, voting in national parliaments on partici-
pation in the EMU will take place. Id. In January 1, 1999, the participating member
states will fix their exchange rates irrevocably against each other and against the euro.
Id. The ECB will begin a single monetary policy operation. Id. All dealings with com-
mercial banks and foreign exchange activities will be transacted in euros. Id. The dollar
and the yen will be quoted against the euro. Id. The euro will exist only as banking cur-
rency. January 1, 2002, euro notes and coins will be circulating alongside national bank
notes and coins. Id. In July 1, 2002, only euro notes and coins will be in circulation in
member states. Id.
8 See Europhoria in Markets as Currency Debuts, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 4, 1999, at Cl,
(reporting strong debut of euro as sign of alternative currency to dollar); see also Euro's
in Place, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 1999, at C4 (reporting high start for euro); Euro Tram-
ples Dollar on First Day of Trading, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Jan. 5, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 6705665, at *2 (reporting euro trading exceeded expectations).
9 See EMU: Implication for Business and Trade, KPMG, U.K., 1997 (visited Nov. 5,
1997) <http://www.kpmg.co.uk/uk/services/manage/emu04.html> (discussing three ex-
pected benefits from single currency: Reduced exposure to currency fluctuations, reduced
and simpler costs, and improved intra-European trading).
10 See Practical Arrangements, supra note 2, at 3-4 (stating that single currency in
Europe will become main exchange and reserve currency similar to dollar and yen and
that will enhance monetary sovereignty as well as stability in international monetary
system); see also Robert P. Imman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The EMU and Fiscal Policy in
the New European Community: An Issue for Economic Federalism, 14 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 147, 148-49 (1994) (noting that EMU benefits are lower transaction costs, price
stability, improved market integration, and increased capital liquidation); Jarrod W. Wil-
cox, Single European Currency to Bring Stability, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 53, Nov. 10,
1997, available in 1997 WL 8292178, at *1 (noting that introduction of euro will be sig-
nificant event for financial markets and global investor).
11 See Practical Arrangements, supra note 2, at 2 (citing reduction of cost associated
with exchange rates among several European currencies as one advantage of euro).
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diminishing the risk associated with currency exchange among
the Member States that would correlatively stabilize the predict-
ability of profit with respect to trade and investments. 12 The
euro will provide a solid and stable economic framework for the
EU markets, which is a necessary platform for gaining investors'
confidence. 13 Such a steady economy, in turn, will stimulate
growth and employment throughout Europe. 14  Companies
across the globe will tap into the EU markets to raise capital as
the euro becomes one of the prime currencies in the world in one
of the largest trade unions of the world. 15
12 See Elke Thiel, The Euro: Should the U.S. Worry?, 4 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 447, 448-
49 (1998) (noting that euro aimed at helping European financial markets in several ways:
1) eliminating currency fluctuation which would improve business planning and rational-
ize investment decisions; 2) euro help EU better retain its investment capital which had
shifted to United States in 1980s; 3) euro use as store of value by international investors
will increase because of its liquidity).
13 See Eileen Walker & Andrew Curwen, M & A and EMU - International Perspec-
tive, EUROPEAN VENTURE CAP. J., July 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12679886, at *3
(noting that successful euro would provide stable economic framework which should
boost investment and competition providing new opportunities for companies to invest);
see also George Sirell, Sterling Fails the Fine Tests for EMU, TIMES LONDON, Oct. 28,
1997, available in 1997 WL 9238879, at *7 (noting that single currency would create
stable economic zone that enjoys low inflation which is framework for investment and
investors' confidence); Savings Banks Issue Favorable Opinion on Single Currency, EURO.
REP., Jan. 8, 1998, available in 1997 WL 8514920, at *2 (stating that European Savings
Banks Group's view on decisions taken by EU concerning legal frame work for euro
should boost financial market's confidence in euro).
14 See Practical Arrangements, supra note 2, at 3. The single currency will promote
investment and employment in two ways. Id. First, single currency based on a solid eco-
nomic framework in which public deficits are controlled and price stability is secured,
will encourage trade, improve allocation of resources, encourage increased savings, en-
hance growth and create more employment as well as higher living standards. Id. Sec-
ond, European Central Bank will ensure price and monetary stability throughout
Europe. This will foster market confidence, which will contribute to lower interest rate
for long term debt. Id.
15 See European Monetary Union, Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representa-
tives Committee of Banking & Financial Services (Apr. 28, 1998) (testimony of Klaus
Friedrich, Chief Economist, Dresdener Bank Group), available in 1998 WL 11517062, at
*16 [hereinafter Freidrich] (noting that if euro becomes successful financial markets in
Europe will offer attractive investment opportunities and serious alternative to invest-
ment in dollar or yen); see also Jane Applegate, Investors, Companies to Benefit from
Euro, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 19, 1998, at H8 (reporting that European financial ex-
perts expect euro will attract investments); Eugene Low, Be Prepared to do Business in
Euro, Asian Firms Told, Bus. TIMES (Sing.), Sept. 17, 1998, at 9 (reporting that Asian
companies including Japanese are preparing to take advantage of euro and its expected
integrated capital market to raise capital); Richard Clark Lowry, Ready or Not, Here
Comes the Euro!, TREASURY MANAGEMENT ASS'N J., Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL
18723896, at *10-12 (noting that it will become easier and more attractive for companies
to raise capital in euro); Morgan Stanley: Euro Zone is Attractive, L'ECHO, Oct. 6, 1998,
at 18 (reporting that Barton Biggs, top analyst at Morgan Stanley, thinks euro financial
markets will be "the place to be" in next 2 years). See generally Patricia Pollard, The Role
of the Euro as an International Currency, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 395, 419 (1998) (noting
that use of euro as international currency in medium and long-term will increase); Gre-
gor Schmitz, How Will Euro's Introduction Affect American Companies?, NEWS &
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The move into an economic and monetary union is a momen-
tous opportunity for Europe to standardize its capital markets. 16
In order to utilize the strength of its uniform currency and
maximize the capability of its economy, it will be desirable, and
perhaps inevitable, that the EU coordinate and harmonize the
rules and conventions of the equity market. 17 Unified market
rules will provide greater transparency, 18 minimize trade barri-
ers, 19 and promote market efficiency. 20 These harmonized rules
in a market of the size and capability of the EU will provide
companies and investors the opportunity and the confidence to
tap into its capital markets to take advantage of its solid econ-
OBSERVER RALEIGH, Oct. 5, 1997, at F5 (noting that proponent of euro argue it will en-
hance competitiveness of EU against Japanese and American rivals in Europe).
16 See Graham Bishop, EMU on Track, EUROMONEY MAG., Aug. 1997, at 37 (noting
bankers and regulators have began preparing for smooth changeover, and introduction of
euro is seen as opportunity to create simple and transparent standardized euro capital
market); see also Wilcox, supra note 10, at *3 (arguing that single European capital mar-
ket will likely emerge for bonds, stocks, and futures).
17 See Economic and Monetary Union: Commission Communication on the Impact of
the Introduction of the Euro on Capital Market, COM(97)337 final at 3 [hereinafter Im-
pact of Euro]. Concluding that the main effect of the euro on the equity market is that
exchanges will trade and quote in euro from Jan. 1, 1999. Id. Coordination and harmoni-
zation of market rules and conventions appears to be less important than in bond mar-
kets. Id. Redenomination is a company's decision, but it is essential at the start of stage
3. Id. Non par value (NPV) shares is recommended as a solution for eliminating the
physical exchange of share certificates, but NPV implementation requires national legis-
lation to be adopted in most of the member states. Id.; see also Pollard, supra note 15, at
419-20. Developing an integrated and liquid European financial market will increase the
use of the euro for private financial transactions, as reserve currency, and as vehicle cur-
rency.
18 See THE GRADUATE CONFERENCE, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that single currency
will intensify competition within Europe by making prices more transparent, which will
help create more efficient economy).
19 See Gay H. Evans, European Monetary Union: A Perspective on the Capital Mar-
kets, J. LENDING & CREDIT RISK MGT., May 1, 1997, at 18 (noting that absent market
transparency and harmonization liquidity will be impaired and disputes will arise); see
also Sampat Mukherjee, The EU and Euro: Will the Benefits Outweigh the Costs, Bus.
LINE (Hindu), Oct. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13717474, *5-6 (suggesting euro will
diminish trade barriers).
20 See THE GRADUATE CONFERENCE, supra note 1, at 17. ; see also Common Currency,
Common Wealth?, TIMBER TRADE J., Mar. 1, 1997, at 23 (noting that main benefit for UK
to Join EMU is elimination of exchange rate between European Currencies which will
create more efficient single market); Countdown to the Euro, EUR. REP., Apr. 25, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 8801614, at *5 (reporting Italian optimism and expectations of in-
creased efficiency in single currency market); International Economic Implications of the
Euro, OECD ECON. OUTLOOK, June 1, 1997, at 24 (noting that euro will increase effi-
ciency in European Financial Market); Mukherjee, supra note 19, at *5-6 (noting that
euro will promote trade which will support more efficient plants leading to efficiency in
market); Regarding the Euro/European Nations Need This Tool to be More Competitive,
HOUS. CHRON., June 9, 1998, at 18 (noting that euro will promote growth and efficiency
in market).
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omy, stable currency, and large market. 2 1 This unified currency
system combined with a unified market will give Europe the op-
portunity to become a major financial and commercial center. 22
As a result, the EU will be competing fiercely with the United
States capital markets, the financial capital of the world.23 In-
evitably, investment activity will shift from the U.S. to Europe,
posing a unique challenge to the United States capital mar-
kets. 24 Furthermore, this European rise will adversely affect the
United States' ability to remain the dominant player in the
world's financial markets. 25
In order to compete with Europe's emerging economic system,
the U.S. must intensify its efforts to attract more foreign com-
panies to list on its national exchanges. 26 Although foreign list-
ings have been growing in recent years, the Security and Ex-
change Commission's ("SEC") stringent rules for listing on U.S.
21 See Pollard, supra note 15, at 419-20 (noting that developing integrated and liquid
European financial market is key to boost euro use as international currency).
22 See James Flanigan, Euro's Value Promises to be More than Monetary, L. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1998, at D1 (stating that Europe's total capital market $27 trillion is larger than
U.S. $23 trillion); Roger Hogan, Continental Drift Threatens U.S. Dominance, AUST'L.
FIN. REV., Oct. 19, 1998, at 44 (noting that market participants see Europe as potential
rival to U.S. capital market); Potential for Euro to be a Serious Rival to Green Back, Bus.
TIMES (Malaysia), Aug. 11, 1997, at 4 (noting that euro capital market come closer to size
of U.S. market); Alessandro Prati & Gary J. Schinasi, What Impact Will EMU Have on
European Securities Markets?, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 1, 1997, at 47 (noting that Europe's fi-
nancial markets could rival US market if EU took advantage of opportunities for greater
integration in financial markets presented by of euro); Significance of the Euro to India,
HINDU, Aug. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 15912624, at *5 (noting that euro will trans-
form EU into largest financial market).
23 See C. Fred Bergsten, The Dollar and the Euro, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1, 1997, at
83 (noting that US dollar will have euro as serious rival and as much as $1 trillion of in-
ternational investments may shift from U.S. to Europe); see also Friedrich, supra note
15, at *4 (stating that competition between Europe, U.S. and Japan will become fierce
and that euro will strengthen Europe global competitive position); Low, supra note 15, at
*3 (noting that American Economist Robert Mundell predicts euro and U.S. dollar will
each account for 40% of world's foreign exchange reserves by 2006).
24 See Asia Can Count on Friends in Euroland, BANGKOK POST, July 20, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 7893764, at *5 (noting that there may be portfolio diversification of $500
billion to $1trillion into euro mainly from investors switching out of U.S. dollar);
25 See Flanigan, supra note 22, at D1 (quoting Bronwyn Curtis, Economist of No-
mura Securities stating that euro gives Europe opportunity to create largest single fi-
nancial market in the world).
26 See Sheryle Bagwel, Euro Embrace, AUSTL. FIN. REV. 27, Dec. 7, 1998, available in
1998 WL 20237084, at *6 (noting that euro market will attract interest of international
investors who may shift large part of their portfolio into European markets as those
markets become integrated); see also James R. Kraus, International U.S. Banks Look
Like Leaders in the Euro Race, AM. BANKER 1, July 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL
13322292, at *6 (reporting that American bank executives believe that emerging single
market in Europe will provide opportunity to distribute euro-denominated securities and
to bring Latin American and other non-European issuers into European Market).
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exchanges are hampering the trend of internationalization of the
U.S. capital markets. 27 Furthermore, unless the SEC adapts to
this drastic change in the European monetary system, the risk of
losing the competitive edge currently held by the U.S. capital
markets might be unavoidable. 28
This Note asserts that as Europe takes advantage of its uni-
fied monetary system, it will eventually move toward harmo-
nized market regulations that create an optimal environment for
investment activities. Furthermore, this Note argues that this
combination of a single currency and harmonized market regu-
lations will tip the balance of global financial power from the
United States to Europe. 29 The United States securities laws,
therefore, must be reshaped so that U.S. capital markets can
compete with the emerging EU markets. Now more than ever,
the SEC has the burden of attracting foreign companies to list on
domestic exchanges, and to conciliate the shifting of financial
activities to the European capital markets. 30 This Note proposes
that the SEC's rules should be modified to promote growth in the
United States capital markets without jeopardizing the inves-
tor's financial future. Less stringent regulations and, ultimately,
the deregulation of the securities markets will achieve this
27 See Jay D. Hansen, London Calling?: A Comparison of London and U.S. Stock Ex-
change Listing Requirements for Foreign Equity Securities, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L 197,
210-11 (1995) (discussing burdensome and costly process of registering under Securities
Act or Exchange Act due to type of disclosure and reconciliation to GAAP imposed on
foreign companies); see also NYSE Calls for Rule Change to Allow Foreign Listings, Help
U.S. Compete, 24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 645, May 1, 1992, at 68 (demonstrating difficult
listing process for foreign companies); NYSE President Says Exchange Needs Leeway in
Foreign Listing Rules, 24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 42, Jan. 10, 1992, at 42 (arguing SEC re-
strictions pose formidable barrier to foreign listings); NYSE Drafting Plan to Boost List-
ings by Foreign Firms, Despite SEC Opposition, 23 SEC. REG. & L REP. 1754, Dec. 20,
1991, at 1754 (explaining NYSE plans to entice foreign issuers).
28 See Friedrich, supra notel5, at *17 (noting that shifts in international investment
portfolio will increase euro liquidity seriously impacting US dollar as currency of biggest
capital market); Prati & Schinasi, supra note 22, at 1 (noting that introduction of euro
will give Europe financial market opportunity to rival U.S. markets in size and effi-
ciency).
29 See generally Tom Buerkle, Business Bets on Single Currency, Brussels Notebook,
INV'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 13, 1995, at 9 (stating that Jaques Samter, European Commis-
sion President, believes introduction of euro would increase Europe's bargaining power
on global stage); Robert J. Guttman, An Interview with European Commissioner Yves-
Thibault De Silguy, EUR. MAG., Sept. 1997, at 9 (noting dollar is used for 80% of interna-
tional transaction, whereas US trade represents only 18 or 20 % of world exports; after
introduction of euro, Europe will become major player in monetary terms).
30 See Sheryle Bagwell, A Sober Wall Street Counts Down to Euro's New Year Fire-
works, AUSTL. FIN. REV. 13, Dec. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20237692, at *3-4
(noting that euro will be vital to creating unified and liquid capital market in Europe
which will attract overseas investors and companies).
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goal. 31 Unless the SEC responds to this challenge, the United
States will risk losing its competitive edge in one of the world's
most lucrative businesses.32
II. THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION
The monetary coordination and the introduction of a single
currency will help foster the integration of the European econo-
mies. 33 The introduction of the euro will thus make Europe a
major economic, political and financial force. 34 Shifting the
myriad of European currencies to one currency will likely reduce
speculation and raise confidence among investors as to the sta-
31 See Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the Internationalization of
the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States, the Euro-
pean Community, and Germany, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 565, 615-16 (1994).
The terms "deregulation" and "regulation" cover multiple concepts, and the use of
these terms is not uniform. Deregulation often refers to the removal of restraints on
competition. These restraints, also known as "access regulations," usually consist of
economic regulations which restrict either access to markets or activities performed
by market participants. This type of deregulation must be distinguished from
"prudential deregulation" which is the removal of rules serving the goal of investor
protection....
In recent years, deregulation of the capital markets in the United States was
mainly prudential deregulation. The ... regulation of the U.S. securities market,
which was intended to ensure the highest level of protection, brought about the op-
posite effect in certain cases. U.S. securities laws imposed such a significant burden
upon foreign investors that the U.S. market became highly unattractive. In other
cases the strong investor protection resulted even in disadvantaging U.S. investors
in relation to foreign investors. Thus, the United States had to lower investor pro-
tection standards with respect to foreign issuers in order to reduce transaction costs
to the levels in foreign countries.
Id.
32 See Challenge for Yen After Euro's Birth, DAILY YOMIURI/YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Dec.
31, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21957382, at *1-2 (reporting results of survey conducted
by major U.S. financial institution revealed that 60 percent of institutional investors in
Japan, U.S. and Europe predict there will be more purchases of euro than yen and dollar
next year); see also Kraus, supra note 26, at *1 (noting that US banks are preparing to
grab shares of what they expect to be most attractive and fast growing financial markets
next decade).
33 See John F., Jr. Gror, Betting Against a Euro, FIN. WORLD, Feb. 18, 1997, at 20
(noting that it is expected that EMU will foster trade and cut borrowing costs which will
help Europe economy); Craig L. Jackson, Social Policy Harmonization and Worker Rights
in the European Union: a Model for North America, 21 N. C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1,
63 (1993) (discussing that uniform currency will help attain goals of Maastricht treaty of
integrated European economies); Thomas Kamm, Countdown: with Monetary Union
Around the Corner, Europe's Doubts Grow, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1997, at Al (noting that
Europe will become fully integrated market and that euro will give Europe real economic
and political power).
34 See Practical Arrangements, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that single currency will
provide citizens of Europe with many advantages including efficient single market,
stimulation of growth and employment, elimination of cost related to currency exchange,
international stability, and enhanced monetary sovereignty).
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bility of such currency. 35 The dominant position of the U.S. dol-
lar in the international monetary system, accounting for 80% of
all trade transactions, may then dissipate.36 Eventually, the euro
will give Europe a monetary strength comparable to its trading
capability. 3 7
A. Golden Opportunity for the European Capital Market
The European Stock Exchanges ("ESE") and the Federation of
European Stock Exchanges ("FESE") have announced that be-
ginning January 4, 1999, European exchanges in the member
states will trade and quote all securities in euro. 38 Although the
introduction of the euro will not necessitate an immediate coor-
dination and harmonization of capital market rules and conven-
tions, it is inevitable that a uniform system of procedures and
rules will improve the efficiency of the European market.39
As the EU pursues its objective of consolidating peace and
prosperity, the argument for the full integration of economies
and for the harmonization of the rules to promote market effi-
ciency is compelling. 40 Consequently, this Note contends that,
35 See Brian K. Kwrynian, Challenges to Monetary Unification in the European Sov-
ereignty Regaining Supreme, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 135, 142 (1994) (declaring that
primary reason for adoption of common uniform currency is to maintain currency stabil-
ity in member states).
36 See Martin Walker, The Euro: The View from America, EUROMONEY MAG., Aug.
1997, at 13-14 (noting that head of Institute for International Economics and former US
treasury official, Fred Bergsten, warned IMF that introduction of euro could lead to dis-
ruptive shift of up to one trillion dollars out of US currency into European).
37 See Guttman, supra note 29, at 9 (noting that euro is Europe response to globali-
zation in markets which will give EU more competitive position and growth, and give
Europe voice in international monetary system which is comparable to its trading
power); see also Bruce Barnard, European Central Bank to Play Leading Role, EUR.
MAG., Sept. 1997, at 6-7 (noting that although US dollar still dominates official reserves,
it has been declining from 76 % in 1973 to 63 % in 1994; while EU currencies in total pri-
vate wealth portfolio rose from around quarter in 1988 to more than third, while share of
dollar declined from more than 50 % to around 40 %); John H. Works, Jr., The European
Currency Unit: The Increasing Significance of the European Monetary System's Currency
Cocktail, 41 BUS. LAW. 483, 511 (1986) (discussing how European monetary unit will
challenge U.S. dominance in global finance).
38 See Impact of Euro, supra note 17, at 17-18 (stating these exchanges intend to
pursue "Big Bang" approach which would imply: quotation in euro; transactions in euro;
inter-market settlement in euro); see also Bishop, supra note 16 (noting European Cen-
tral Bank will deal only in euros with money and foreign exchange markets, and Federa-
tion of European Stock Exchange will move all stock exchange trading and settlement to
euro at outset).
39 See Impact of Euro, supra note 17, at 2 (suggesting that harmonized market rules
and conventions are desirable for providing greater transparency, avoidance of dispute
and clarity).
40 See Louis F. Delluca, Teaching of the European Community Experience for Devel-
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unified European capital markets will become an integral part of
the EMU, and will enable the market to move toward greater
transparency to insure full market integration and harmoniza-
tion.41 It is also submitted that trading securities in a harmo-
nized European capital market will enhance European market
liquidity and currency stability.42 As a result, investing in
Europe will become increasingly attractive, thereby making the
European market a prime financial center. 43
B. The Threat to the United States Capital Market
President Clinton once said that "the United States should
[not] feel threatened by the prospects of a European currency nor
by the prospect of European integration in general. ' 44 Global
competition and the forthcoming united European market, how-
ever, poses a potential threat45 to the dominant position of the
United States capital markets. 46 The flow of investments away
oping Region of Organizations, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 485, 505 (1993) (discussing goals of
Maastricht Treaty as intending to bring members closer with respect to economic, social,
monetary, political, and foreign policy grounds); see also Andrew Fisher, Bigger is Better
in Bourses' Brave Euro World, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 1997, at 3 (noting that EMU would
provide opportunity to end fragmentation and settlement rules in financial market giving
Europe opportunity to rise as financial center); Impact of Euro, supra note 17, at 4-5
(recommending harmonization of market rules to allow for maximum benefit from euro).
41 See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 232 (1990). The
European Communities have prior experience in harmonizing the rules of their markets,
and this is an evidence of what might happen during the era of the euro. Id.
42 See EMU Capital Market Could Rival U.S., Dow JONES INT'L NEWS SERV., Nov.
20, 1997, at 12 (noting that EMU gives Europe opportunity to dismantle barriers in fi-
nancial markets, thereby, creating capital market that would rival U.S.); see also Philip
Lane, Countdown to EMU - 333 Days to Go, IR. TIMES, Feb, 2, 1998, at 17 (noting euro
will help developing large and liquid integrated financial market).
43 See Jonathan R. Macey, Will Euro's Heat Make U.S. Firms Wilt, NAT'L. L.J., Sept.
1, 1997, at A17 (arguing that shift from small and midsize currencies to euro will force
consolidation in commercial and investment banking industries, thereby enhancing
Europe's financial position relative to New York's).
44 See Walker, supra note 36, at 13 (quoting President Clinton from an interview in
Oval Office).
45 See Nicholas G. Demmo, Comment, U.S. Securities Regulation: The Need for Modi-
fication to Keep Pace with Globalization. 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 691, 693 (1996)
(noting that complying with U.S. regulatory requirements for listing is expensive, and as
foreign markets improve they will attract companies away from U.S.); see also Macey,
supra note 43, at A17 (noting that introduction of euro will give rise to Europe as impor-
tant financial center leading to decline of New York as financial capital). C.f. Andrew
Leckey, Strong Dollar Doesn't Weaken Outlook for US Financial Stocks, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
16, 1997, at C3 (stating best opportunity for US equities to perform well comes from
strong dollar drawing international capital to US markets).
46 "U.S. capital market" or "U.S. exchange" as used in this Note, refers to the three
securities exchanges in the United States that offer foreign securities for trading: the
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from the United States toward Europe during the euro era is
foreseeable if domestic regulatory requirements do not become
more lenient, thereby facilitating the transformation of the U.S.
markets into more attractive financial forums. 47 Thus, unless
U.S. policymakers respond with a more flexible and competitive
regulatory structure, the dominant position of the U.S. capital
market is in jeopardy. 48
The rigid and burdensome regulatory requirements of the
United States securities laws are problematic in light of both
the internationalization of the securities world and the potential
rise of Europe as a major financial market. 49 Reforming current
regulations is crucial to maintaining our competitive position in
the global capital market. 50 The focus of the SEC as we enter
the new millennium should be on balancing the need for investor
protection against the need to make the market more hospitable
to foreign listings. 51
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CAPITAL MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES
The Securities Act of 193352 ("1933 Act") and the Securities
and Exchange Act of 193453 ("1934 Act") were Congress' response
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) system.
47 See Demmo, supra note 45, at 722 (concluding that U.S. securities regulations de-
veloped with bias towards investor protection at time when there was lack of interna-
tional competition and therefore SEC should be alerted to recent trend of internationali-
zation of securities markets, evaluate current regulations, take steps to lessen burden on
foreign issuers, and promote competitiveness in markets ).
48 See Bevis Longstreth, A Look at the SEC's Adaptation to Global Market Pressures,
33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 320 (1995) (stating if regulatory burden imposed on
foreign issuers by SEC is disproportionate to those of other capital markets, foreign issu-
ers will stay away).
49 See Ellen S. Perelman, Single Global Strategy Impossible Despite Internationaliza-
tion of Financial Markets, AM. BANKER, May 24, 1985, at 16 (discussing myriad of incon-
sistent laws and regulations governing US banks and financial service operations in
other countries); Peter Riddell, Brad Urges Tight Capital Requirements for US Banks,
FIN. TIMES (London), July 26, 1990, at 6 (discussing layers of regulations concentrating
in riskier parts of traditional commercial lending in US banking system); Roquette, supra
note 31, at 568 (expressing concerns relating to SEC stringent regulations).
50 See Demmo, supra note 45, at 722 (concluding that SEC should relax rules for
foreign issuers to help foster internationalization of U.S. capital Market).
51 See Steven M. H. Wallman, Competition, Innovation, and Regulation in the Securi-
ties Markets, 53 BUS. LAW. 341, 371 (1998) (concluding that SEC should consider separat-
ing regulations from trading functions to ensure competitive markets and effective self
regulation).
52 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
53 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 7811 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
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to the abuses in the capital market in the years leading up to the
1929 stock market crash.54 Under the 1934 Act, the SEC is the
federal agency responsible for administering and enforcing the
securities laws.55 The SEC's prime concern is to administer and
enforce the securities laws, promote public interest in a free, or-
ganized, and fair securities market, and to assure the protection
of investors.56
Throughout this decade, the use of equity as an alternative fi-
nancing vehicle has increased dramatically. 57 The privatization
trend throughout the world, and in the emerging and developing
countries in particular, is shaping the race for capital.58 The
54 See H.R. CON. REP. No. 73-1838 (1934); H.REP. No. 73-1383 (1934); S. REP. No.
73-792 (1934); see also J. William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors Under US Se-
curities Laws: The Impact of International Regulatory Competition. 1 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 431, 432-433 (1994) (discussing purpose of 1930's securities regulations);
Jonathan R. Macey et. al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule
and its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799,
799 (1989) (noting that market crash of 1929 provided congress opportunity to introduce
securities laws that exist today); Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the
Commodity Futures Industry - History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 101 (1991)
(noting that stock market crash in 1929 resulted in introducing Securities Exchange Act
of 1934); Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(B): Security Prices
and the Text of the Securities Exchange Act Of 1934, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 359, 362
(1988) (noting that Exchange Act was direct response by congress to perception that
stock market crash in 1929 was due to abuses and speculation); Steve Thel, The Original
Conception of Section 10(B) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 408-09
(1990) (noting that Exchange Act was passed in response to 1929 stock market crash).
55 The SEC was established by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §
78b (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
56 See Hicks, supra note 54, at 432-33 (noting that securities laws were aimed at
rectifying abuses that lead to 1929 crash and restoring investor confidence in stock mar-
ket); see also Commissioner Isaac C. Hunt Jr., Remarks at the Ohio Council-Institute of
Management Accountants 22nd Annual Professional Development Conference, Kent State
University (Apr. 19, 1996), available in 1996 WL 225187, at *1-2 (discussing origins of
SEC); Richard Kosnik, The Role of the SEC in Evaluating Foreign Issuers Coming to the
U.S. Markets, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 97, 97 (1994) (discussing mandate of SEC to ensure
integrity of markets and protection of investors); Pat McConnell, Practical Company Ex-
perience in Entering US Markets: Significant Issues and Hurdles From the Advisor's Per-
spective, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 120, 122 (1994) (discussing US disclosure system as su-
perior protection for investors).
57 The trend toward world privatization is one factor behind the booming equity
markets. See, e.g., James L. Cochrane et. al., Foreign Equities and U.S. Investors: Break-
ing Down the Barriers Separating Supply and Demand, 2 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 241,
241 (1996) (noting worldwide increase in supply of equity); Roberta S. Karmel, Living
with U.S. Regulations: Complying with the Rules and Avoiding Litigation, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 152, 154-156 (1994) (noting increase in equity financing).
58 See Nancy Dunne, Multinationals 'Rising to Energy Challenge,' FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1996, at 4 (stating privatization and need for investments have created scores of new
multinationals in global energy market); The UN, the US, and Development Cooperation:
Time for a Reunion, UN CHRONICLE, Dec. 22, 1996, at 72 (advocating developing coun-
tries' ownership as essential to sustainability and success); William Rhodes, Personal
View: Don't Cut and Run in a Crisis, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 1994, at 17 (discussing restruc-
turing of debts in Chile, Mexico, and Argentina).
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U.S. capital markets are currently the largest in the world, rep-
resenting approximately half of the world's capital. 59 The New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") is the largest exchange in the
world with approximately 3000 listed companies, of which 11%
are foreign. 60 While the increase of foreign listings in the U.S.
capital markets during the past five years has been substan-
tial,61 the strength of the United States market is not yet fully
utilized or easily accessible by foreign companies in need of capi-
tal.62
There are two major barriers to the entry of foreign companies
into the U.S. capital markets. 63 First, companies that want to
sell their issues publicly are required to register their securi-
ties,64 make full disclosure of all material facts in public offer-
ings and are required to file periodic financial reports with the
59 See Cochrane, supra note 57, at 242 (stating that of $18 trillion total world capi-
talization, U.S. investors hold about $7 trillion). See generally Capital Markets Provide
Funds for Projects Abroad, NAT'L. L.J., Dec 22, 1997, at Bll (discussing huge proportion
of capital market that US holds).
60 See Cochrane, supra note 57, at 247 (noting that volume of foreign trading on
NYSE in 1994 was about 11%); see also Big Board Studies Broadening of Its Foreign-
stock Dealing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1994, at C1 (noting NYSE is seeking to trade stock
in foreign currency to maintain prestige); Robert A. McTamaney, New Securities Law
Expands Options for U.S. Investors, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1997, at 52 (emphasizing new
trend toward offshore diversification); Rule Change Would Ease Canadian Entry to
NYSE, FIN. POST, Apr. 12, 1997, at 3 (explaining current difficulty for Canadian corpo-
rations seeking to list on NYSE); Suzanne Wooley, The Booming Big Board, BUS. WK.,
Aug. 4, 1997, at 58 (noting NYSE is trying to increase its roster of foreign companies).
61 See Wooley, supra note 60, at 58 (noting in 1997, one out of every four new listings
in NYSE was foreign, increasing its roster of foreign companies).
62 See Cochrane, supra note 57, at 243 (noting that only 252 of 2,300 foreign com-
panies that meet quantitative listing requirements are listed on NYSE); see also Wooley,
supra note 60, at 58 (noting international companies eligible to list on NYSE valued at
$8.4 trillion, which approximate total capitalization of NYSE-listed companies).
63 See Todd Cohen, The Regulation of Foreign Securities: A Proposal to Amend the
Reconciliation Requirement and Increase the Strength of Domestic Markets, 1994 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 491, 493-94 (1995) (noting that most cited obstacle to entry into U.S. capital
market for foreign issuers are strict disclosure requirement and reconciliation of their
financial documents with GAAP).
64 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77h (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see
also Daniel A. Braverman, U.S. Legal Consideration Affecting Global Offerings of Shares
in Foreign Companies, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 30, 37-43 (1996) (setting out detailed
analysis of disclosure requirements for registered companies); Cohen, supra note 63, at
493-95 (1995) (noting that securities laws are premised on belief that to protect investors,
companies must provide all information necessary to help investors make informed in-
vestment decisions); John P. Redd, Worlds Apart? - FASB Issues a Report that Analyzes
US and International Accounting Standards, 11 INSIGHTS 19, Apr. 1997, at 19
(discussing report issued by Financial Accounting Standards Board illustrating differ-
ences between GAAP standards and International Accounting Committee Standards);
US Standards Chief Rejects IASC Alternatives, ACCT., Sept. 1, 1995, at 5 (stating that
multinationals are increasingly venturing offshore and continue to lobby for use of inter-
national standards to list on US exchanges).
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SEC.65 Second, regulatory requirements mandate that foreign
companies must reconcile their home country financial account-
ing documents to the United States General Accepted Account-
ing Principals ("U.S. GAAP"). 66 The underlying policy for the
registration and disclosure requirements is to help investors
make an informed investment decision and to protect them from
fraudulent misrepresentation. 67
The regulatory requirements represent major barriers to entry
into the United States markets. 68 Compliance with U.S. GAAP,
the rigorous disclosure requirement, and the cost associated with
overcoming those barriers, hamper the United States equity
markets' ability to develop as global markets. 69 The extra cost
needed to comply with United States securities laws may drive
foreign companies to list in other less regulated, low cost capital
65 See Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78m, 780(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see
also Cochrane, supra note 57, at 243 (noting that U.S. regulatory requirement that for-
eign companies reconcile their financial accounting documents to U.S. GAAP is thwart-
ing capital markets' efforts to globalize).
66 See Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(2) (1994) (requiring foreign issuers to
reconcile their home-country financial statements with U.S. GAAP).
67 See Cohen, supra note 63, at 494-95 (noting that although SEC is aware of diffi-
culties foreign companies face when listing on U.S. exchanges, it is constrained by Con-
gress' mandate of protecting investors through rigorous disclosure requirements); see
also David S. Ruder, Reconciling US Disclosure Policy With International Accounting and
Disclosure Standards, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 2 (1996) (noting that securities regu-
lators should balance investor protection with need to be responsive to differences in
marketplace); SEC Policy Statement on the Regulation of International Securities Mar-
kets, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE No. 6807, 53 Fed. Reg. 46, 963, (Nov. 1988). See generally
Lisa K. Bostwick, The SEC Response to Internationalization and Institutionalization:
Rule 144A Merit Regulation of Investors, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 423, 424 (1996)
(reasoning that securities laws requiring disclosure are aimed at protecting investors).
68 See Cochrane, supra note 57, at 249 (noting that high demand for foreign securi-
ties in US market is negated by high entry regulations); see also Joseph E. Pompeo, Ac-
counting & Disclosure Issues Facing Emerging Market Issuers, in INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES MARKETS 1996, at 125 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B4-7166, 1996) (stating that accounting and disclosure procedures for foreign entry into
US securities market are more difficult than for domestic corporations); Eric M. Sherbet,
Bridging the GAAP: Accounting Standards for Foreign SEC Registrants, 29 INT'L LAW.
875, 875 (1995) (stating that rigid securities requirements imposed on foreign corpora-
tions prevent them from entering US capital market); Michael A. Schneider, Note, For-
eign Listings and the Preeminence of U.S. Securities Exchanges: Should the SEC Recog-
nize Foreign Accounting Standards? 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 301, 302-03 (1994) (noting
that forcing foreign companies to comply with US GAAP standards in order to list in US
exchanges is great impediment for attracting foreign companies).
69 See Cochrane, supra note 57, at 243 (noting that U.S. regulatory requirement that
foreign companies reconcile their financial accounting documents to U.S. GAAP is
thwarting capital markets efforts to globalize); see also James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S.
Securities Laws in the Shadow of International Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 161 (1992) (indicating that foreign companies are discouraged
from listing in US market due to stringent disclosure requirements).
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markets. 70 In addition, American investors seeking to diversify
or maximize their return on investment will pursue cross border
investments that best satisfy their financial needs. 71 As inves-
tors and issuers meet each other overseas, outside the reach of
SEC regulation, the protection policy underlying these regula-
tions will become a sophistry.72
The need to attract an even greater number of foreign compa-
nies to list on the United States exchanges is evident by in-
creased investment flow offshore. 73 The SEC's objective in
regulating the market, therefore, should be to strike a balance
between protecting the investor and encouraging foreign list-
ings. 74 In light of this shift of investments away from the U.S.
market, it could be argued that simplifying and reducing regis-
tration and disclosure requirements will minimize entry barriers
70 See Bostwick, supra note 67, at 430-31 (noting that foreign issuers are dissuaded
from U.S. capital markets because of required compliance with U.S. GAAP and costs as
well as conflicting standards of disclosure for registering with SEC); Luis F. Mareno
Trevino, Access to US Capital Markets for Foreign Issuers; Rule 144A Private Placements,
16 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 159, 162-63 (1993) (examining steps that US has taken to ease re-
porting requirements for foreign companies); Simon Brady, Evolution, Not Revolution,
EUROMONEY, June 1, 1990, at 47 (discussing purpose of 144A to attract companies to US
from others where disclosure requirements are not so exacting); Shaking Up America's
Capital Market, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 1990, at 89 (discussing impact of rule 144A on at-
tracting foreign issuers to US markets).
71 See Christopher J. Mailander, Searching for Liquidity: United States Exit Strate-
gies for International Private Equity Investment, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 73-75 (1997)(noting that U.S. investors interest in foreign equities is promise of higher return than
that in domestic market, as well as lower risk in their portfolio by diversifying portfolio).
72 See James A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC Manda-
tory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 119, 167
(1996) (noting that foreign companies reluctant to enter U.S. markets because of disclo-
sure requirement would stay offshore where U.S. investors could follow them); see also
Lonnie S. Keene, Note, Globalization and Competition: A Proposal to Liberalize Foreign
Securities Disclosure Regulation, 29 N.Y. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 337, 355-56 (1997)
(arguing that SEC registration and disclosure requirement does not protect U.S. inves-
tors, rather only divert their trading activities to more costly and less regulated mar-
kets).
73 See Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Rules in the Global
Market, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 241, 249 (1997) (noting that purchase of foreign stocks
by U.S. investors increased from $3 billion in 1980s to more than $50 billion in 1995); see
also McTamaney, supra note 60, at 52 (noting that offshore investment will increase to
almost $2 trillion in next three years); S. Jane Rose, The New Wave of International
Funds 123, at 125 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6814, 1987)
(noting that strong global securities markets and higher yields of foreign debt instrument
have attracted US investors who perceive foreign securities as means to increase invest-
ment returns and diversify portfolio risk).
74 See Ruder, supra note 67, at 2 (discussing need to balance investor protection
against realities of each marketplace in relevance to world market problems); SEC Policy
Statement on the Regulation of International Securities Markets, SECURITIES ACT
RELEASE NO. 6807, 53 FED. REG. 46, 963 (Nov. 1988) (emphasizing features necessary to
protect and promote globalization).
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and undoubtedly result in increased foreign listings in the U.S.
as well as decreased offshore investment. 75
A. Foreign Listings and Offerings in the United States
The size, sophistication, and liquidity of the United States
capital markets offers companies listed on its exchanges access
to capital that is unmatched elsewhere. 76 Currently, a foreign
company may conduct a public offering in the U.S. by: 1) listing
on one of the exchanges or on the National Association of Secu-
rities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ);77 2) issuing an
American Depository Receipt ("ADR") and selling its stocks in
the pink sheet market; 78 or, 3) conducting a private sale pursu-
ant to Rule 144A of the Securities Act. 79
Another method for listing foreign companies in the United
States is the private placement market.8 0 Private placement of
securities is exempt from section 5 registration under the federal
securities laws. 8 1 One advantage for an issuer in a private
75 See Demmo, supra note 45, at 694 (concluding that by easing regulatory burden on
foreign companies would provide U.S. exchanges opportunity to remain competitive in
global financial market).
76 See Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and US Securities Markets in Time of
Economic Transformation, 17 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. 77, 85 (1994) (noting that depth and
liquidity of US capital market are major attraction to foreign companies); see also Wil-
liam E. Decker, The Attraction of the US Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers and the
Alternative Methods of Accessing the US Markets: From the Issuer's Perspective, 17
FORDHAM INI'L L.J. 10, 10 (1994) (discussing vast capital opportunities available in US
markets).
77 See Decker, supra note 76, at 13-20 (discussing methods for public offerings in
U.S.).
78 See American Depository Receipts, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE No. 33-6894, 56 FED.
REG. 24, 420-21 (May 30, 1991). American Depository Receipts ("ADR") are securities is-
sued by American banks or trust companies that represent beneficial ownership of for-
eign securities held by the issuing institution. Id.; see also Cochrane, supra note 57, at
253-54 (noting that ADR market is largest and fastest growing market for foreign com-
panies because reconciliation requirement with GAAP is not imposed upon them); Mark
A. Saunders, American Depository Receipt: An Introduction to US Capital Markets for
Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 48, 49-50 (1993) (discussing attributes of
ADRs utilized by foreign private issuers); Joseph Velli, American Depository Receipt: An
Overview, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 38, 39 (1994) (examining ADR process for foreign pri-
vate issuers).
79 See 17 C.F.R. s. 230.144A (1990). But see Jeffrey B. Tevis, Asset-Backed Securities:
Secondary Market Implications of SEC Rule 144A and Regulations, 23 PAC. L.J. 135, 139
(1991) (concluding that rule 144A and Regulation S may result in financial fraud).
80 See Bostwick, supra note 67, at 425-428 (discussion private placements in U.S. in
detail); see also Mailander, supra note 71, at 91-96 (noting that private placement may be
beneficial for avoiding administrative burdens and cost associated with registering public
offering under securities laws).
81 See Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1994).
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placement is lower transaction costs than those associated with
public listings.8 2 A second advantage is that the private place-
ment process is faster than that of a public offering. 83 Finally,
private placement provides more confidentiality than other
methods. 84 Private placement, however, bears some disadvan-
tages to issuers such as a higher cost associated with reduced li-
quidity8 5 and a restrictive financing structure.86
B. Investor's Interest in Foreign Stocks
Investors diversify investment portfolios to minimize risk and
to cope with securities fluctuation.87 Portfolio diversification can
be a two-dimensional strategy by virtue of multi-company and
multi-national holdings. 88 First, investing in different compa-
nies shields investors from risking their entire capital should one
company become bankrupt, dissolve, or decline in value. 89 Sec-
ond, investing internationally or in foreign securities also mini-
mizes the risk of associating the entire investment portfolio with
the political, economic or currency stability of one country.90 In
82 See Bostwick, supra note 67, at 426. A private placement may cost one-third of
what public offering costs because of reducing costs associated with section 5 registra-
tion, and may eliminate financial intermediaries because of direct negotiation between
issuers and investors. Id.
83 See Bostwick, supra note 67, at 426-27. Since there is no lengthy registration re-
quirements for private placement, it may be complete in much less time than public of-
fering. This gives issuers a "window of opportunity" at time of market volatility. Id.
84 See Bostwick, supra note 67, at 426-27. Exemption from section 5, which requires
disclosure of sensitive financial information, offers private issuers the advantage of con-
fidentiality. Id.
85 See id.
86 See id. at 428.
87 See Demmo, supra note 45, at 695-696 (noting that risk of portfolio securities is
less than risk of individual securities, and that international stocks can reduce risk of
investor's portfolio because of low correlation between returns of foreign securities and
returns of U.S. securities); see also Schneider, supra note 68, at 327 (noting that U.S. in-
vestors are increasingly investing in other developed countries and emerging markets to
diversify their portfolio and to search for higher return).
88 See Robert J. Alberta & Percy S. Poon, The New Prudent Investor Rule and the
Modern Portfolio Theory: A New Direction for Fiduciaries, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 39, 57-61
(1996) (defining "portfolio diversification" as reduction of risk associated with any given
investment by investing in more than one security); Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and
Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 19 (1997).
89 See Alberta & Poon, supra note 88, at 57-60 (discussing portfolio diversification
theory); see also Robert A. Levy, The Prudent Investor Rule: Theories and Evidence, 1
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) (noting that risk of given investment could be neutral-
ized by combining in diversified portfolio).
90 See Stephen M. Penner, Note, International Investment and the Prudent Investor
Rule: The Trustee's Duty to Consider International Investment Vehicles, 16 MICH. J.
INTL. 601, 644 (1995) (noting that international investment may optimize portfolio di-
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addition, investment return from foreign securities can, at times,
be higher than that of the United States securities, increasing an
investor's overall return. 91
Two types of investors exist in the United States market: Re-
tail investors and institutional investors. 92 In recent years,
however, the role of institutional investors has increased dra-
matically. 93 This shift toward sophisticated institutional inves-
tors calls into question the protective regulatory measurements
taken by the SEC relative to promoting efficiency in the mar-
ket.94 Since institutional investors have the knowledge, exper-
tise, and resources to analyze and compare different companies
according to their respective markets, they are well equipped to
make informed investment decisions. 95 Therefore, institutional
investors do not need the full protection of the securities laws.96
The dominant position that institutional investors have
achieved is a major force in the offshore investment trend.97 The
versification because foreign investments are not sensitive to macroeconomics factors
that may affect U.S. market).
91 See Demmo, supra note 45, at 696-97 (comparing return of U.S. securities markets
to foreign securities markets); see also Rick A. Haberman, Note, It's not Your Father's
Pension Fund: ERISA's Prudent Investor in the International Market, 22 J. CORP. L. 771,
772-73 (1997) (noting that one factor for increased U.S. international investment is that
some scholars believe international investment provide better risk-return ratio than
those confined to national market); Levy, supra note 89, at 22 (noting that adding foreign
stocks to portfolio may increase return and reduce risk); Penner, supra note 90, at 637-41
(noting that international investment represents unique opportunity for U.S. investor to
reduce risk without reducing return).
92 See DAVID L. SCOTT, WALL STREET WORDS 178-79 (1988). Retail investors are in-
dividual investors, while institutional investors are entities such as insurance companies,
investment companies, pension funds, and trust departments that invest large sums in
securities markets. Id.
93 Demmo, supra note 45, at 695. "By 1990, institutional investors held fifty-three %
of the value of publicly-traded US equity and accounted for over seventy percent of the
volume of US traded securities." Cf. J. William Hicks, Securities Regulation: Challenges
in the Decades Ahead, 68 IND. L.J. 791, 794 (1993). In late 1975, retail investors owned
70% of total equities outstanding. Id.
94 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Zen and the Art of Securities Regulation, in MOD-
ERNIZING US SECURITIES REGULATIONS: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Kenneth
Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992) (noting that rules and regulations that are
attractive in markets dominated by retail investors can lead to inefficiency and distortion
in markets dominated by sophisticated institutional investors).
95 See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market. 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1903-4 (1997) (noting
that institutional investors are well equipped to conduct sophisticated investigations of
companies and capable of learning about securities regulation across international
boundaries in cost effective way).
96 See Elmer W. Johnson, An Insider's Call for Outside Direction, 68 HARv. BUS. REV.
46, 52 (1990) (arguing that institutional investors do not need SEC protection).
97 See Profile Survey, The Committee on Investment of Employee Benefit Assets,
Washington, D.C. (1994). Many US institutional investors have set targets of 20-25% for
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shift of investments to the European market will arguably in-
crease with the introduction of the euro.98 This shift represents
a lost opportunity for the U.S. capital markets and therefore
limits the growth of the U.S. capital markets. 99 Considering the
vital role that national exchanges play in providing companies
access to capital, the lost opportunity may have significant long-
term effects on the flow of capital to industries, and therefore, on
the financial well-being of the U.S. economy. 100
It is imperative that the SEC recognize the significance of the
international sector since domestic growth opportunities in the
U.S. capital markets constitute only a fraction of the vast poten-
tial in the markets outside this country. 10 1 Although the inter-
nationalization of the securities market has accelerated dramati-
cally in the United States, 102 the SEC's regulatory requirement
the foreign portion of their equity portfolios; a number of the more aggressive or sophisti-
cated institutions have already achieved these levels. Id.; see also McTamaney, supra
note 60, at 52. US pension funds alone will increase their offshore investment to almost
$2 trillion in next three years. Id.
98 See Asian Capital Markets, Asia: A Key Battleground for Euro Debt?, EUROWEEK
18, Feb. 19, 1999, available in 1999 WL 8713721, at *2-3 (noting that euro will provide
Asian issuers opportunity to benefit from this new and deep source of funding); see also
Euro Brief: The International Euro, ECONOMIST 89, Nov. 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL
11700571, at *5-6 (noting that economists are divided into two groups one arguing that
euro would attract investors to shift into euro to diversify portfolio, and other group
stating that euro has to prove it is stable before any shift of investment to euro could
take place); Europe's Monetary Union, The United States and International Cooperation,
Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Pol-
icy Committee on Banking and Financial Services (Apr. 18, 1998) (statement of C. Ran-
dall Henning, American University and Visiting Fellow, Institute for International Eco-
nomics), available in 1998 WL 11517063, at *8-9 (suggesting that attractiveness of euro
for international investors will depend on speed and extent of European markets' move
toward liberalization and integration); India: Eleven Becomes One, BUS. LINE (Hindu),
Dec. 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20734987, at *8-9 (noting that efforts to integrate
European financial markets will allow euro to create big financial and capital market
providing Indian companies greater opportunities to raise capital in euro).
99 See Economic Policy Challenges Facing the Euro Area and the External Implica-
tions of EMU, WORLD ECON. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 28621108, at
*2-3 (reporting that-euro may eventually challenge dollar in financial transaction); see
also Henning, supra note 98, at *9 (noting that euro might play role equal to that of U.S.
dollar if European markets become integrated and unified).
100 See Written Responses of Arthur Levitt, Chairman- Designate of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, to the Senate Banking Comm., 103d Cong., 1s Sess. (1993)
[hereinafter Levitt] (describing US national exchanges as "vital asset" to US economy);
see also William J. Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant Regulation of Foreign Secu-
rity Trading and US Competitiveness, in MODERNIZING US SECURITIES REGULATION 39
(Kenneth Lehn & Robert Kamphuis eds., 1992) (concluding that current SEC rules are
"potentially detrimental" to US economy).
101 See Cohen, supra note 63, at 492 (noting that foreign securities available through
mutual funds are inadequate to satisfy investors need).
102 See Keene, supra note 72, at 341-342 (noting that foreign companies registered
public offerings in 1995 total $41 billion, and that average foreign stocks trading on
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that foreign issuers either prepare their financial disclosures in
accordance with or reconciled with U.S. GAAP remains expen-
sive, time consuming, and burdensome. 103
C. SEC Response to Internationalization and Institutionalization
Although the SEC has been hesitant to exempt foreign issuers
from the disclosure requirements and reconciliation of their fi-
nancial records with U.S. GAAP, it has taken several steps to
facilitate listings by foreign companies. 104 The SEC extended
the integrated disclosure system to foreign issuers in 1982 after
recognizing the internationalization 0 5  and institutionaliza-
tion 106 of the world's financial markets. 107 This extension was
designed to simplify the duplicative disclosure requirements as-
serted by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 108
NYSE has increased from 11.3 million in 1991 to 36.4 million in 1995).
103 See Demmo, supra note 45, at 693 (discussing burdensome regulatory require-
ments of SEC as applied to foreign issuers); see also Cohen, supra note 63, at 494
(explaining hesitance of foreign companies to list in US markets due to substantial ex-
pense of reconciling financial statements to US GAAP); McConnell, supra note 56, at 127
(noting difficulty that foreign companies have with footnote disclosure).
104 See Bostwick, supra note 67, at 423 (noting that Rule 144A was adopted to in-
crease globalization of U.S. capital markets; but unsound response to internationaliza-
tion); see also, Stephen Davis, The Allure of ADRs, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, Sept.,
1994, at 112 (noting that SEC has become more "issuer-friendly"); Bevis Longstreth, How
SEC Responds to an Expanding Global Market to Accommodate Foreign Issuers, the
SEC's Strategy is to Minimize Risks and Proceed Cautiously, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1994, at
C6 (forecasting that the SEC will employ reduced regulatory burdens in order to encour-
age foreign investments); Ruder, supra note 67, at 5 (stating that securities regulation
have been relaxed).
105 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE
SECURITIES MARKETS (1987). Internationalization may be defined as the growth in trans-
actions by US and foreign investors outside the investor's home country. Id.
106 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Institutional Investor Study Report,
H.R. DOC. No. 64, 92d Cong., 181 sess. (1971). Institutionalization may be defined as the
growth in the participation of large entities, "qualified institutional buyers" ('QIB"), in
the US and world capital markets. Id.; see also DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT
EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS Il-1 (1994). QIBs are institutions with over $100 million
invested in securities, and typically consist of mutual funds, pension funds, and insur-
ance companies. Id.
107 Adoption of Foreign Issuers Integrated Disclosure System, Sec. Act Release No.
6437, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 72, 407 (Nov. 19, 1982) (adoption of comprehensive revi-
sion to rules and form applicable to foreign private issuers); see also Paul M. Cushing,
Note, Barriers To The International Flow Of Capital: The Facilitation Of Multinational
Securities Offerings, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81, 90-91 (1987) (stating that in 1982,
after concluding that public interest in foreign issuers outweighed investors protection,
SEC modified foreign disclosure requirements to ease access of foreign issuers into US
market).
108 See Cushing, supra note 107, at 90-91 n. 71 (stating that new rules issued by SEC
in 1982 made foreign disclosure regulations less burdensome, making market closer to
internationalization); see also K. FRED SKOUSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SEC 46 (5th
1998]
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In another attempt to open U.S. capital markets to foreign
companies, the SEC recently adopted Rule 144A 10 9 to facilitate
the trading of foreign securities in the United States by institu-
tional investors. 110 Although Rule 144A provides foreign issuers
greater access to the United States capital markets, its has been
criticized as an unsound response to internationalization and in-
stitutionalization. 111 As the trend of globalization continues, 112
however, the United States capital markets stand in the best
position to benefit from both the equity that is replacing alter-
native ways of raising capita 1 13 and the massive shift in the
ed. 1991) (stating that integration of requirements of 1933 and 1934 Acts with share-
holder's reports would improve financial reporting and reduce costs of compliance).
109 17 C.F.R. Sec. 230.144A (1999) (regulating resales of private securities to
"qualified institutional investors").
110 See Edward F. Greene & Allan L. Belier, Rule 144A- Keeping the U.S. Competitive
in the International Financial Market, 4 INSIGHTS 3, 3 (1990) (stating that rule 144A was
enacted to open foreign door for reluctant foreign issuers to enter into U.S. market);
Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Lansdale, Jr., Regulation S and Rule 144A: Creating a
Workable Fiction in an Expanding Global Securities Market, 29 INT'L LAW. 43, 62 (1995)
(noting that Rule 144A and Regulation S represents step by SEC to decrease regulatory
restraints and to facilitate uniformity in international securities transactions).
Il See Ronald R. Adee, Rule 144A Offerings of American Depository Receipt, 6
INSIGHTS 9, 12 (1992) (noting that although adoption of Rule 144A and Regulation S has
facilitated capital raising by foreign companies, Rule 144A did not achieve its intended
consequences of increasing liquidity of secondary market for privately held securities);
see also Bostwick, supra note 67, at 445 (concluding that policy rationale built on investor
qualification is inappropriate response to internationalization and institutionalization);
Vickie Kokkalenios, Note, Increasing United States Investment in Foreign Securities: An
Evaluation of SEC Rule 144A, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 179, 201 (1992) (noting problems
with Rule 144A that affect competitive position of US in international securities market);
Raymer W. McQuiston, Rule 144A, Regulation S and Amending the Glass-Steagall Act: A
New Look at Foreign Banks and Foreign Issuers Participating in the United States Secu-
rities Market, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 171, 173 (1991) (noting that limitations
and restrictions built into Rule 144A regarding foreign private issuers, may unfairly and
unnecessarily prevent participation in this new market).
112 See Schneider, supra note 68, at 302 n.8, citing Joseph Grundfest, Internationali-
zation of the World's Securities Markets: Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences,
4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 349, 361-65 (1990). The globalization of securities markets has
been primarily driven by five forces. Id. The first is pure economics. Id. at 361. Second,
increases in computer and telecommunications technology have fueled a worldwide net-
work of brokers, dealers, and investors with powerful capabilities to conduct large trans-
actions instantaneously. Id. at 361- 62. Third, the increasing emphasis on global diversi-
fication has increased the demand for foreign securities and investments as investors
seek to diversify across economies. Id. at 362-63. Fourth, the explosive growth of deriva-
tive securities has increased demand of foreign securities, as investors use options, fu-
tures, and indices to diversify and speculate across economies. Id. at 364. Fifth, regula-
tory barriers continue to fall in all major markets. Id. at 364-65. Worldwide deregulation
facilitates international securities trade by lowering costs and easing access to foreign
capital markets. Id.
113 See Karmel, supra note 57, at 154-156. One commentator notes:
[Tihere are only four ways for business enterprises to get funding to finance their
activities: equity, government funding, debt, and self-funding. Much of what has
been fueling the internationalization of the markets over the past few
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holdings of United States investors into foreign equity. 114 Al-
though more foreign companies are listing and offering securities
in the United States, 115 there still exists a failure to capture and
attract a large portion of the companies that meet the United
States exchanges' quantitative requirements for listing.116
As the globalization trend of capital markets continue, issuers
will seek markets that value their companies the most and in-
vestors will pursue investments that most closely meet their fi-
nancial needs. 117 The SEC, therefore, is faced with enormous
pressure with respect to the globalization of capital markets. 118
The securities regulations should balance the need for protecting
the investors while simultaneously focusing on easing the bur-
years .... have simply dried up for one reason or another.
The financial collapse of former Communist and Socialist countries and the huge
budget deficits all over the Western world make it very difficult, if not impossible, for
economic enterprises to continue to be financed through government grants almost
everywhere. This has led to privatization in developed Western countries and in
emerging countries. Privatization have been the driving force behind much of the in-
ternationalization of the securities markets, and in particular behind the decisions of
various foreign issuers to enter the U.S. markets.
... [E]quity financing is becoming the primary way in which companies are going to
have to raise capital everywhere. In many situations, the capital markets are consid-
erably ahead of the regulators. I think that the solutions to the problems of the capi-
tal markets that we have been discussing today will come from investor demands,
not necessarily from initiatives taken by regulators. Nevertheless, regulation is im-
portant.
Id.
114 See Cochrane, supra note 57, at 242 (noting that US investors hold $7 trillion of
total world capitalization of $18 trillion and that it is expected within next few years,
they will double foreign components of their equity portfolios from 5% to 10%, translating
into $350 billion moving away from US market into foreign equity markets); see also C.
Nicholas Revelos, Transnational Securities Regulation: Can US Investors Have Their
Cake and Eat it Too?, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 87, 92 (1994) (stating that foreign issuers of-
ten structure their offerings in manner to avoid participation by US investors in order to
avoid compliance with US securities regulations).
115 See Wooley, supra note 60, at 58 (noting that one out of every four new listings is
foreign, and that listings have almost tripled in past five years to 320 with total market
capital for international companies eligible to list on NYSE is $8.4 trillion).
116 See NYSE Calls for Rule Change to Allow Foreign Listings, Help U.S. Compete,
SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 18, at 643, May 1, 1992 (noting that more than 2,500 of world's
companies meet NYSE requirements and top 10% of those companies have 20 times me-
dian of U.S. prospects for listing).
117 See Choi & Andrew, supra note 95, at 1856 (noting that globalization of securities
markets promise more efficient markets and better diversification of risk, benefiting both
investors and issuers); see also Hansen, supra note 27, at 198-99 (noting advantages and
benefits to companies and investors due to international capital flows); Rose, supra note
73, at 125 (noting that strong global securities markets and higher yields of foreign debt
instrument have attracted US investors who perceive foreign securities as means to in-
crease investment returns and diversify portfolio risk).
118 See Choi & Andrew, supra note 95, at 1906-07 (noting that as globalization of fi-
nancial markets continues pressure on domestic securities regulations to compete inter-
nationally is becoming more important).
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den imposed upon foreign issuers to attract them to the mar-
ket. 119 In order for the U.S. to maintain its prominent position
as a world leader in the capital market, the SEC should focus on
promoting market efficiency. An efficient capital market is nec-
essarily a globally competitive one 120 and unless the United
States market can effectively compete for foreign listings, which
now represent a large growth opportunity, the United States
markets run a substantial risk of being relegated to the status of
regional exchanges. 121
IV. MODIFYING THE SEC'S LISTINGS REQUIREMENTS IN RESPONSE
TO THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE
The SEC's opposition to more flexible listing requirements for
foreign issuers could give rise to negative effects: 1) endangering
investors who seek to optimize their financial well-being by tap-
ping into uncertain foreign markets outside SEC regulation, 122
and 2) slowing the growth of the United States market which is
dependent upon attracting foreign issuers in order to maintain
global dominance. 123
In keeping pace with globalization and facing the European
challenge, the SEC can modify the rigid status quo of securities
laws in several ways. First, the SEC can incorporate flexible
listing requirements for foreign companies regulated by private
119 See Michael V. Hurley, International Debt and Equity Markets: US Participation
in the Globalization Trend, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 701, 708-10 (1994) (emphasizing need
to maintain investor protection while accommodating foreign listings); see also Long-
streth, supra note 48, at 320 (noting if SEC's regulatory burden imposed on foreign issu-
ers are disproportionate relative to other markets, foreign issuers will stay away from
U.S. market, and U.S. investors will seek offshore investment leaving behind protection
of SEC); Cheryl Beth Strauss, Do US Investors Need More Foreign Listings; The SEC
Says it Won't Fix What is Already Working but the NYSE Says It's not Working Well
Enough, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Nov. 19, 1992, at 16 (examining request to further
ease disclosure requirements to attract foreign issuers).
120 See Choi & Andrew, supra note 95, at 1856 (noting that globalization of capital
markets promise greater diversification of unsystematic risks and more efficient mar-
kets, benefiting both issuers and investors); see also Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralism,
Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism and Functionalism: A Comparison with Ref-
erence to Securities Regulation, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 82-85 (1994)
(examining issues relevant to global securities competition and role of regulations).
121 See Schneider, supra note 68, at 302-03 (noting that foreign companies represent
largest growth opportunity for US national exchanges, and attracting them is crucial to
maintain dominance in capital markets).
122 See Demmo, supra note 45, at 713 (noting that investors in search for foreign
stocks are forced to buy overseas where they are not protected by SEC).
123 See Schneider, supra note 68, at 302-03 (noting importance of attracting foreign
companies for growth in U.S. market).
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mechanisms. 124 Second, the SEC can create a bifurcated "world
class" exchange in which foreign companies can list their securi-
ties without full compliance with United States regulations when
trading those securities only to sophisticated institutional inves-
tors. 125 Finally, the SEC can employ a private mechanism of
voluntary disclosure where information can be certified by certi-
fication intermediaries. 126
A. Flexible Listings Requirements
As the trend toward globalization continues, the concern is
how a country-specific regime can be imposed upon international
companies without jeopardizing competitiveness and growth in
the market. 127 It is submitted that instead of waiting for the an-
swer, the SEC should set forth more flexible requirements for
foreign companies. To the extent that these requirements are
compatible with a foreign country's accounting standards, the re-
spective foreign companies should be allowed to list in the
United States markets without requiring them to adhere to the
U.S. GAAP.128
In order to give the investor confidence in the disclosed infor-
mation, however, and to help him understand non-GAAP docu-
ments, certification intermediaries can be employed to interpret
124 See Choi & Guzman, supra note 95, at 1900-03 (arguing that in international
capital markets two private mechanism could provide investment information to inves-
tors one is certification intermediaries, and another is sophisticated institutional inves-
tors).
125 See Demmo, supra note 45, at 720 (suggesting creation of bifurcated exchange
that imposes less regulatory burden on foreign issuers and limits trading of its listed se-
curities to sophisticated institutional investors only).
126 See Choi & Guzman, supra note 95, at 1900. Certification intermediaries include
major securities and investments firms who are able to operate globally across country
borders and to develop standardized procedures to evaluate companies and transmit in-
formation to investors. Id.
127 See Choi & Guzman, supra note 95, at 1856-57 (discussing challenges facing
regulators of securities markets in dealing with globalization of financial markets as it
increases burden of maintaining adequate level of disclosure and remain competitive).
128 See Schneider, supra note 68 n.18, at 337. The SEC has refused to support or
adopt the proposal to recognize foreign accounting standards for several reasons: First,
U.S. companies would be disadvantaged in their home market due to the greater regis-
tration and reporting requirements that would not apply to foreign issuers .... Second,
investors would be prejudiced because information essential to their investment deci-
sions would be unavailable or incomparable.... Third, insider trading would be an even
greater danger considering that investors would not be privy to the information regard-
ing the adjustment and management of net income common in many countries .... Fi-
nally, Rule 144A is now available to provide greater access and liquidity to the private
placement securities market. Id.
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the foreign financial data. 129 Certifiers could be chosen from ex-
perts in the securities industry as well as in international ac-
counting standards. 130 Certification intermediaries provide an
alternative pool of information to help the investors make infor-
mative investment decisions. 13 1 Thus, as an alternative to com-
plying with the SEC's disclosure requirements, foreign compa-
nies wishing to list in the U.S. can obtain a certificate from
participating certifiers that translates their financial informa-
tion into meaningful and understandable terms for potential in-
vestors. 1 3 2
Permitting foreign companies to list their securities under
standards that are different from those applied to domestic com-
panies presents the issue of equality of the treatment between
domestic and international companies, 133 and also the investors'
ability to make a meaningful comparison across national bor-
ders. 134 Some commentators believe, however, that the recon-
ciliation of foreign financial data with U.S. GAAP offers little
protection to U.S. investors. 135 In addition, the SEC's policy of
129 See Choi & Guzman, supra note 95, at 1900-03 (suggesting that certification in-
termediaries is one form of private mechanism that would investigate and fill in relevant
information about investments and make it available to public).
130 See id. at 1901 (listing securities and investment firms such as Goldman Sachs &
Co., and Morgan Stanley Inc., as well as international accounting firms such as Deloitte
Touche, and Arthur Anderson).
131 See id. at 1900-01. Certification intermediaries can help protect investors and
identify higher-value companies globally. Id. Certifiers are major securities and invest-
ment firms, as well as international auditing firms. Id. These entities possess the neces-
sary expertise in the securities industry, and the incentive to perform its duties faith-
fully. Id.
132 See id. "[P]rivate certification agents provide investors in foreign companies with
some measure of protection from fraud and reduce the basic asymmetric information
problem between themselves and foreign issuers." Id. at 1903.
133 See Demmo, supra note 45, at 716. One argument against allowing foreign com-
panies to list on exchanges without full compliance is unfairness to domestic companies;
commentator, however, observes that:
ITihe fairness concern implicitly assumes that US GAAP disclosures are not opti-
mal-that they are not worth their expense. If the US GAAP is valuable to US inves-
tors, then given a choice between two otherwise equivalent companies, they will be
willing to pay more for securities of issuers whose financial data was produced using
US accounting standards. Domestic companies will thus enjoy a lower cost of capital
relative to the foreign issuers that only provide disclosures using home country ac-
counting standards.
Id.
134 See Id. 710-711. Some commentators argue that applying different standards to
foreign companies would disrupt one of securities laws' objective; maintaining equal
treatment for domestic companies. Id. Another concern is that investors would not be
able to properly compare companies when they want to invest if different standards were
to be applied for foreign companies. Id.
135 See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 100, at 39.
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protecting investors appears to be undermined by the increased
flow of offshore investments and the availability of foreign stocks
via ADR's in the "pink sheet" market. 136 Investors, in search of
better investments that are not available domestically are thus
forced to invest in more expensive foreign markets that are be-
yond the protection of the SEC. 137
B. Bifurcated "World Class" Exchange
A bifurcated exchange would allow qualified "world-class"
companies to trade in the United States markets without full
regulatory compliance with U.S. GAAP as long as their trade is
limited to sophisticated institutional investors. 138 It is predicted
that the market will utilize the sophistication of its investors
without taking advantage of them; this is premised on the idea
that institutional investors are equipped with the necessary ex-
pertise to screen good investments from bad investments. 139
Additionally, the elimination of the compliance cost associated
with these regulations could reduce the cost of capital, and such
reduction could be passed on to the investors in the form of a
higher return on their investments. 140 Furthermore, additional
"[Rlegulation that require reformation of foreign earnings data to meet US account-
ing standards may offer little, if any, protection to US investors... Such regulations
can also harm the international competitiveness of the US securities industry if they
prevent US exchanges from making markets in many of the largest corporations in
the world.
Id.
136 See Cochrane, supra note 57, at 253-54 (noting that ADR market is largest and
fastest growing market for foreign companies).
137 See Demmo, supra note 45, at 713 (noting that investors' desire to buy foreign
stocks to diversify their portfolio are turning to overseas markets that are less regulated
and more expensive, faraway from SEC's protection).
138 See James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Ap-
propriate?, 17 FORDHAM IN'L L.J. 58, 61-62. Discussing proposal by NYSE to SEC to
distinguish "world class" companies that establish specific quantitative criteria such as
revenues of U.S.$5 billion, market capitalization of U.S.$2 billion, or average weekly
trading volume outside U.S. of at least U.S.$1 million or 200,000 shares. Id. Such com-
panies would not be required to reconcile their financial statements with U.S. GAAP,
rather would only be required to include explanation of the difference. Id.; see also
Demmo, supra note 45, at 720. Suggesting that similar to NYSE's proposal, SEC could
create bifurcated exchange for foreign companies with relaxed regulatory requirements
and allow institutional investors to trade on that exchange. Id.
139 Choi & Guzman, supra note 95, at 1903-04 (noting that sophisticated institu-
tional investors are able to investigate companies' worth, and ultimately increase effi-
ciency in secondary markets and provide greater protection for small investors).
140 See Hansen, supra note 27, at 210-11 (noting that foreign companies have to in-
vest in systems and hire accountants to compile and reconcile their financial data with
GAAP); see also Schneider, supra note 68, at 302 n.8 (citing Grundfest stating that de-
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foreign companies will experience ease in accessing the market
and more foreign companies will list on the exchanges. 141 These
listings can provide investors more investment opportunities as
well as stimulate market growth and strong economy. 142
C. Self Regulation: Voluntary Disclosure
The most flexible approach to the challenges posed by global-
ized capital markets would be a gradual deregulation of access
regulation into the capital market. 143 Based on the efficient
market theory disclosure requirements that have been manda-
tory would become voluntary since more disclosure helps com-
panies raise investors' confidence in their issues. 144 Investors,
on the other hand, will value investment opportunities based on
the quality and quantity of the disclosed information.145 Hence,
giving the market adequate information about the company
would raise investors confidence in the stocks, increase its de-
mand, and ultimately determine the value of the company. 146
Alternatively, less disclosure would keep the investor cautious
about the value of the company, giving him the opportunity to
undervalue the company. 147 The market will become more effi-
cient by allowing investors to choose ways of diversifying their
regulation of international securities laws lower cost of capital and ease access to foreign
markets).
141 See Cox, supra note 69, at 161 (noting that foreign companies are discouraged
from listing in U.S. due to stringent regulatory requirement); see also Schneider, supra
note 68, at 302-03 (noting that disclosure rules and GAAP requirement are impeding
U.S. markets' ability to attract foreign companies); Sherbet, supra note 68, at 875 (noting
that regulations imposed on foreign companies are making U.S. markets unattractive)
142 See Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury, The Financial Crisis in Asia: We
Must Protect our Economic and National Security Interests, VITAL SPEECHES 267, Feb.
15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10849743, at *2 (stating that in current global economy
expanding economic ties through increased trade, investment, and capital flow has
helped foster growth in U.S.); see also Richard Schwartz, Small Stock Markets Can Give
Clues to Global Direction, CAPITAL DISTRICT Bus. REV., Apr. 20, 1998, available in 1998
WL 7329473, at *2 (noting vital role of capital markets in global economy).
143 See Warren, supra note 41, at 188 (noting that access deregulation has been
driving force and political response to internationalization in capital markets and that
such deregulation in Europe provided unprecedented access to its market).
144 See Ruder, supra note 67, at 12-13 (noting that based on efficient market theory,
price of security reflects historic and public information available through activities of
financial analysts and investors in market).
145 See Schneider, supra note 68, at 334-35 (arguing that there is incentive for com-
pany to disclose information regardless of statutory requirement because investors will
value its stocks more and therefore lower its cost of capital).
146 Id. (suggesting that companies that do not disclose information will be assessed
as high risk companies by investors, making their cost of capital higher).
147 Id.
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portfolio while giving companies more flexibility in structuring
their strategies of disclosure of relevant information to the public
according to their market position ultimately benefiting the
United States. 148
V. CONCLUSION
The current U.S. regulatory policy is outmoded and burden-
some given recent global economic challenges. Such regulation
merely serves to dissuade businesses from investing in U.S.
markets at a time when the European financial markets are
striving to establish themselves as international financial cen-
ters. It is crucial for United States policymakers to act now.
The possibility of the United States to drive financial activities
offshore with the current stringent regulations is inevitable. As
a result, foreign issuers and United States investors will be
forced to find each other overseas. Ultimately, investor protec-
tion will effectively be narrowed to domestic activities and the
growth of United States equity market will cease.
Securities laws should balance the needs of protecting our in-
vestors with that of promoting growth in the market. Deregula-
tion aims to create a flexible system in which investors would
meet their respective companies easily, and companies would
strive to reach its pool of potential investors through effective
disclosure suited for all those involved.
Joseph F. Jacob
148 See See Choi & Guzman, supra note 95, at 1883.
[Tihe global securities market should be free to determine for itself-through a
market-based competitive process between regimes-the amount of diversity in re-
gimes. The market then balances the benefit to issuers and investors from multiple
regimes against the cost to different countries of maintaining a completely different
level of regulation.
Id.; see also David E. Van Zandt, The Regulatory and Institutional Conditions for an In-
ternational Securities Market, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 47, 79 (1991). It has also been suggested
that international securities market is one where activities of investors and issuers are
not restricted their to their national markets, and such market is either central market
or set of competing decentralized markets. Id.
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